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17 
CONSTITUTIONAL MATURITY, OR 
READING WEBER IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 
Josh Chafetz* 
We might be in trouble. That, at least, would seem to be the 
premise of this symposium: after all, symposia on the current state 
of constitutional law tend to proliferate when there is anxiety 
about the current state of constitutional law. And this symposium 
is hardly alone in expressing such anxiety—conferences, books, 
and articles fretting about the American constitutional order in 
“the age of Trump” abound.1 
One common technique for getting a handle on anxiety is to 
try to take a step back, to think in broader terms about the 
 
 * Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I am grateful to Jill Hasday, David Pozen, 
Aziz Rana, Catherine Roach, and Justin Zaremby for helpful and thought-provoking 
comments on earlier drafts. Any remaining errors or infelicities are, of course, my own. 
 1. See Josh Chafetz, What Do Presidents Need to Know?, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV. 
(Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/books/review/corey-brettschneider-
oath-and-the-office.html (“Popular books about the Constitution are something of a 
countercyclical phenomenon. When all is well in the polity, they are relatively scarce on 
the ground. Their recent profusion—and, in particular, the development of the this-book-
is-about-timeless-constitutional-truths-not-about-Trump-wink-wink subgenre—is not a 
great sign, then, for the health of our body politic.”). On the use of the “age of Trump” 
trope in particular, see, e.g., FIGHT FOR LIBERTY: DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE 
OF TRUMP (Mark Lasswell ed., 2018); MICHIKO KAKUTANI, THE DEATH OF TRUTH: 
NOTES ON FALSEHOOD IN THE AGE OF TRUMP (2018); CARNES LORD, THE MODERN 
PRINCE: WHAT MACHIAVELLI CAN TEACH US IN THE AGE OF TRUMP (2018); DAVID 
NEIWERT, ALT-AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 
(2017); Erin Delaney, Immigration in the Age of Trump: Extremism vs. Exceptionalism, 
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE: TRUMP 100 DAYS (April 29, 2017), 
https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/immigration-in-the-age-of-trump/; 
Michael Millemann, Checks and Balances in the Age of Trump, 17 U. MD. L.J. RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1 (2017); “Connecting the McCarthy Era to the Age of 
Trump”—A Symposium at NYU’s Center for the United States and the Cold War, Sept. 15-
16, NYU, https://www.nyu.edu/about/news-publications/news/2017/september/symposium
-on-the-cold-war-and-mccarthyism.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2018); Parties & Partisanship 
in the Age of Trump Symposium, USC SOL PRICE SCH. OF PUB. POL’Y, 
https://priceschool.usc.edu/events/event-details/?event-id=1184437 (last visited Nov. 23, 
2018); The Prospects for American Democracy in the Age of Trump: A Preliminary 
Assessment, CORNELL, http://events.cornell.edu/event/the_prospects_for_american_
democracy_in_the_age_of_trump_a_preliminary_assessment (last visited Nov. 23, 2018). 
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situation. And turning or returning to some of the classic works of 
the past, works inspired by a similar set of questions but written 
in a different time or place, can often assist us in thinking through 
what might be new about the present—and, at least as 
importantly, what might be familiar about it. 
In this Essay, I propose to look back about a century, and 
across the Atlantic, to the great German social theorist Max 
Weber. In Weber’s work, we find important insights into both the 
institutional structures of the modern state and the character 
traits that constitute a successful politician. For Weber, maturity, 
understood in terms of balance, or the productive negotiation of 
the tensions between conflicting principles, characterizes both the 
successful state and the successful politician. In this moment in 
American history in which concerns abound about both the 
resilience of our institutional arrangements and the character of 
our president, it is especially illuminating, I think, to turn to 
Weber’s reflections on both types of maturity. 
I. A MATURE POLITY? 
“America cannot continue to be ruled by amateurs.” 
- Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1919)2 
When he delivered his Politics as a Vocation lecture a century 
ago, Weber insisted that the United States had just begun to enter 
its political maturity. The domination of American politics by the 
Jacksonian “spoils system”—the organization of party machinery 
around the dispensing of patronage—was characteristic of its 
political youth.3 Indeed, the spoils system was only possible 
because of American immaturity: “For it is self-evident that the 
existence of three to four hundred thousand party supporters who 
had nothing to show by way of their qualifications for office but 
the fact that they had served their party well—such a state of 
affairs could not survive without major abuses: corruption and the 
squandering of resources on a vast scale such as could only be 
borne by a nation with as yet unlimited economic prospects.”4 
 
 2. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 32, 71 (David 
Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., Hackett 2004).  
 3. Id. at 67–68.  
 4. Id. at 69.  
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But then we grew up and got rationalized. “Civil Service 
Reform”5—a phrase he left in English—“is now creating lifelong 
pensionable posts in constantly growing numbers. In 
consequence, posts are now being filled by university-educated 
officials who are just as incorruptible and competent as in 
Germany.”6 
The Prussian’s comparison to Germany was a double-edged 
sword. He was in fact deeply concerned about the modern 
German state. In Weber’s view, Otto von Bismarck’s creation of 
a powerful centralized bureaucracy and the first modern welfare 
state had come at the expense of political leadership. Once 
Bismarck himself had left the stage, there was no one with the 
combination of talent and training to take his place: “Since the 
resignation of Prince Bismarck Germany has been governed by 
‘bureaucrats,’ a result of his elimination of all political talent. 
Germany continued to maintain a military and civilian 
bureaucracy superior to all others in the world in terms of 
integrity, education, conscientiousness and intelligence.... But 
what about the direction of German … policy during recent 
decades?”7 The ship of state, though powerfully rowed, was 
rudderless in Weber’s estimation, because Germans had gotten 
out of the habit of thinking about politics, instead abdicating the 
governance of public life to the bureaucracy alone. And without 
a vibrant public politics up and running, there was no way to 
develop a new generation of political talent, such that the rule of 
the bureaucracy risked becoming a self-perpetuating cycle.8 
For Weber, politics and bureaucracy were distinct realms of 
collective activity,9 both of which were necessary in a modern 
 
 5. On the path of American civil service reform, see JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S 
CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 113–16 
(2017); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 236–40 (2012). 
 6. WEBER, supra note 2, at 71–72.  
 7. Max Weber, Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany (1918), 
reprinted in 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1381, 1404–05 (Guenther Roth & 
Claus Wittich eds., 1978) [hereinafter Weber, Parliament and Government].  
 8. See id. at 1413; see also Sven Eliaeson, Constitutional Caesarism: Weber’s Politics 
in Their German Context, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 131, 134–36 
(Stephen Turner ed., 2000). 
 9. It should be noted that Weber’s terminology, and especially his distinction 
between politics and bureaucracy, is specific to his project. It is certainly possible—and in 
the service of other projects, quite sensible—to conceive of bureaucracy as a subset of 
politics. See, e.g., CHAFETZ, supra note 5, at 16 (defining “politics” far more capaciously 
as “the processes and institutions of collective self-government,” a definition that would 
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state. It is well known that he characterized politics as a 
“vocation” (Beruf); it is less remembered that he characterized 
bureaucracy with exactly the same term.10 As he understood it, 
modern bureaucracy had six essential characteristics: (1) rule-
delineated jurisdictions; (2) a hierarchy of offices; (3) written 
record-keeping and file-keeping; (4) specialization and a system 
of training specific to the areas of specialization; (5) full-time 
commitment by its practitioners; and (6) a system of stable, 
general, learnable rules.11 These characteristics of modern 
bureaucracy implied some concomitant characteristics of modern 
bureaucrats. For Weber, the bureaucrat was appointed, not 
elected; served for life (by which he meant had legal protections 
against discretionary firing or transfer); received a regular salary; 
and occupied a rung of a defined career ladder.12 (It should be 
noted that, for Weber, these characteristics imply that modern 
legal systems—even common law ones—are bureaucracies.13) 
Above all, the ethic of bureaucracy is an ethic of 
rationalization, in at least two senses of the word. First, 
bureaucracy is fundamentally concerned with reason-giving—
indeed, bureaucratic action is illegitimate without some statement 
of reasons.14 (In modern American administrative law, this has 
taken the form of a component of the Administrative Procedures 
Act’s prohibition on agency action that is arbitrary or 
capricious.15) Second, and at least as importantly, the rationalism 
characteristic of bureaucracy prescribes the form those reasons 
 
include both the bureaucracy and the courts as political institutions). Because my goal in 
this Essay is to mine Weber for insights into our current constitutional situation, I adopt 
his terminology here. 
 10. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 958–59 (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich eds., 1978); see also WEBER, supra note 2, at 44 (“[M]odern bureaucracy [has 
developed] into a specialized, highly qualified, intellectual workforce that has undergone 
a lengthy preparatory period of training. This workforce has a highly developed sense of 
professional honor with an emphasis on probity.”). 
 11. 2 WEBER, supra note 10, at 956–58.  
 12. Id. at 960–63.  
 13. Id. at 975–80. On what we might think of as the decisive moment for the 
bureaucratic turn in English-derived legal systems, see Thomas McSweeney, English 
Judges and Roman Jurists: The Civilian Learning Behind England’s First Case Law, 84 
TEMP. L. REV. 827, 832–33 (2012). 
 14. 2 WEBER, supra note 10, at 979 (“[I]n principle a system of rationally debatable 
‘reasons’ stands behind every act of bureaucratic administration, namely, either 
subsumption under norms, or a weighing of ends and means.”). 
 15. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 
515 (2009) (understanding the “arbitrary or capricious” standard to require “that an 
agency provide reasoned explanation for its action”). 
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must take. In particular, the logic of bureaucracy requires that 
decisions be based upon “purely objective considerations,” by 
which Weber means considerations specified in advance and 
applied without regard for the specific persons who will be 
affected by them.16 Indeed, “[w]hen fully developed, bureaucracy 
… stands … under the principle of sine ira ac studio. Bureaucracy 
develops the more perfectly, the more it is ‘dehumanized,’ the 
more completely it succeeds from eliminating from official 
business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and 
emotional elements which escape calculation.”17 
Bureaucracy’s inexorable drive toward rationalization makes 
the governance of a modern state possible.18 Its characteristic 
rationality enables the efficient large-scale mobilization of social 
resources. As increased demands are put upon the state—from 
police protection to social welfare policies to public 
administration of new technologies of communication and 
transportation19—the bureaucratic state’s “technical superiority 
over any other form of organization”20 becomes more and more 
manifest. Governance of an increasingly complex and specialized 
world increasingly requires the work of subject-matter experts, 
and those experts are most naturally housed within bureaucratic 
structures.21 The rationality of bureaucracy also serves a 
legitimating function: as Paul du Gay put it, without a rationalized 
bureaucracy, “many of the qualitative features of government 
that are regularly taken for granted—for instance, reliability and 
procedural fairness in the treatment of cases—would not exist.”22 
 
 16. 2 WEBER, supra note 10, at 975. 
 17. Id.; see also id. at 998 (“Naturally, bureaucracy promotes a ‘rationalist’ way of 
life, but the concept of rationalism allows for widely differing contents. Quite generally, 
one can say only that the bureaucratization of all domination very strongly furthers the 
development of ‘rational matter-of-factness’ and the personality type of the professional 
expert.”); WEBER, supra note 2, at 53 (“[T]he genuine official … should ‘administer,’ 
impartially.”). 
 18. See David Owen & Tracy B. Strong, Introduction to THE VOCATION LECTURES, 
supra note 2, at li (“[F]or Weber there can be no politics in the modern world that is not 
centrally involved with rational-legal Herrschaft, and this means with bureaucracy.”). 
 19. 2 WEBER, supra note 10, at 972–73.  
 20. Id. at 973.  
 21. See id. at 975.  
 22. Paul du Gay, Max Weber and the Ethics of Office, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES: CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS 146, 155 (Paul S. 
Adler ed., 2009). 
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As a result of both its technical superiority and its legitimating 
potential, for Weber “[t]he future belongs to bureaucratization.”23 
But bureaucracy’s rationalization of governance, like the 
rationalization of the rest of modern life, has its dark side. Most 
famously, Weber described the rationalization of the modern, 
capitalistic economic order as “an iron cage” in which the pursuit 
of material goods has become an end in itself, stripped of any 
connection to “the highest spiritual and cultural values.”24 
Because a wholly rationalistic enterprise can never speak in terms 
of ultimate values, the result of the total triumph of 
rationalization is disenchantment, a transformation of “human 
interaction and behavior into a dreary quasi-mechanization, 
bereft of sensuality, spirit, and culture,” in the words of Stewart 
Clegg and Michael Lounsbury.25 Unsurprisingly, the 
“dehumanized”26 governance of bureaucracy has a similar 
tendency in our public life: 
[T]he bureaucratic organization, with its specialization of 
trained skills, its division of jurisdiction, its rules and 
hierarchical relations of authority …. is busy fabricating the 
shell of bondage which men will perhaps be forced to inhabit 
some day, as powerless as the fellahs of ancient Egypt. This 
might happen if a technically superior administration were to 
be the ultimate and sole value in the ordering of their affairs, 
and that means: a rational bureaucratic administration with the 
corresponding welfare benefits, for this bureaucracy can 
accomplish much better than any other structure of 
domination.27 
The bureaucratization of modern governance is thus both at least 
partially inevitable and normatively ambivalent. It has the 
potential—far more than any other technique of governance—to 
organize action in pursuit of collective ends. But it also 
disenchants, making those ends increasingly difficult to identify 
and justify, until, at its logical endpoint, we are left in an iron cage, 
 
 23. Weber, Parliament and Government, supra note 7, at 1401.  
 24. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181–82 
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1976).  
 25. Stewart Clegg & Michael Lounsbury, Weber: Sintering the Iron Cage: Translation, 
Domination, and Rationality, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY AND 
ORGANIZATION STUDIES, supra note 22, at 118, 128. 
 26. 2 WEBER, supra note 10, at 975. 
 27. Weber, Parliament and Government, supra note 7, at 1402.  
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or a shell of bondage, in which we have nothing but aimless 
technique.28 
Importantly, however, there is nothing inevitable about our 
entrapment in that cage or shell. This is because there is an 
opposing force that counteracts, and might perhaps balance, 
bureaucratic rationalization: politics. The politician “is supposed 
to be something different” from the bureaucrat.29 The essential 
difference, for Weber, lies in the sort of responsibility inherent in 
each office.30 A bureaucrat “who receives a directive which he 
considers wrong can and is supposed to object to it. If his superior 
insists on its execution, it is his duty and even his honor to carry it 
out as if it corresponded to his innermost conviction, and to 
demonstrate in this fashion that his sense of duty stands above his 
personal preference…. This is the ethos of office.”31 The highest 
ethical duty of the bureaucrat is to recognize his position and role 
within a rationalistic machine of governance. By contrast, “the 
point of honor of the political leader, that is, the leading 
statesman, is that he acts exclusively on his own responsibility, a 
responsibility that he may not and cannot refuse or shuffle off 
onto someone else.”32 Because politics entails personal 
responsibility, the politician cannot subordinate her own views to 
those of another (as the bureaucrat must do). As a consequence, 
“[p]olitics means conflict.”33 
Because the politician cannot fall back on her role within a 
rationalistic machine (as, again, the bureaucrat must), the 
politician must justify her seeking after power in the name of some 
cause: 
The nature of the cause in whose service the politician strives 
for power and makes use of power is a matter of belief. He may 
serve national or universally human goals, social and ethical 
 
 28. See Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299, 
1321–22 (1997) (“Weber’s assessment, in brief, is that bureaucracy, as a purposive-rational 
mechanism of governance, creates unprecedented possibilities for the mobilization of 
social resources and the exercise of political control. But purposive-rational behavior is 
fulfilling only to the extent that the individual or the society can identify its purposes; if 
that does not occur, then efficiency becomes a purpose of its own, and the bureaucratic 
apparatus turns into an enclosed, self-sustaining system that imprisons its society in an iron 
cage.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 29. Weber, Parliament and Government, supra note 7, at 1404.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.; see also WEBER, supra note 2, at 54 (similar).  
 32. WEBER, supra note 2, at 54.  
 33. Weber, Parliament and Government, supra note 7, at 1399.  
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goals, or goals that are cultural, worldly, or religious. He may 
be motivated by a powerful faith in “progress” (however this is 
defined), or he may coolly reject faith of this kind; he can claim 
to be acting in the service of an “idea,” or he may wish to reject 
such claims on principle and choose instead to promote 
external goods of ordinary life. But some belief or other must 
always be present.34 
Unlike the bureaucrat, then, the politician seeks power in the 
service of articulated ends, and modern politicians, to be 
successful, must have the charisma to line up public support 
behind their articulated ends.35 For Weber, the successful modern 
parliamentary party leader is a type of charismatic ruler—that is, 
a ruler to whom people submit not “because of any customs or 
statutes, but because they believe in them.”36 Politics thus for 
Weber holds out the possibility of partially reenchanting public 
life by reinjecting into it some notion of ultimate ends.37 
We are now in a position to understand why Weber was 
dissatisfied with the governance of Germany in his own day. It was 
not due to the growth of bureaucracy per se—that was both 
inevitable in a modern state and brought with it significant 
tangible and legitimizing benefits. Rather, Weber was dismayed 
by what he perceived to be the absence of any force counteracting 
the bureaucracy. He was upset by the lack of a political 
counterbalance. Bureaucracy without political pushback is what 
lands a polity in an iron cage of rationality, or a shell of bondage. 
But politics without bureaucratic pushback is no better. The 
politician can articulate ends, but she cannot effectuate them on 
her own, which is why modern governance “demands” a 
bureaucratic element.38 And this, in turn, brings us back to 
 
 34. WEBER, supra note 2, at 78.  
 35. On the need for public articulation of those ends, see id. at 53 (“[P]olitics 
nowadays is conducted preeminently in public and through the medium of the spoken or 
written word.”).  
 36. Id. at 35; see also id. at 62 (describing the “charismatic element” of modern party 
leadership). 
 37. See Sung Ho Kim, Max Weber, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY § 4.2 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
weber/#ReeViaDis (“Irretrievably gone … is a unifying worldview, be it religious or 
scientific, and what ensues is its fragmentation into incompatible value spheres. . . . 
[Weber’s] vision of polytheistic reenchantment is rather that of an incommensurable value-
fragmentation into a plurality of alternative metanarratives, each of which claims to answer 
the same metaphysical questions that religion and science strove to cope with in their own 
ways.”). 
 38. 2 WEBER, supra note 10, at 975. 
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America’s political maturation. On Weber’s telling, America’s 
nineteenth-century underdeveloped bureaucracy was a luxury: 
“even the worst management by dilettanti could be tolerated in 
view of the limitless abundance of economic opportunities.”39 
America, in effect, paid to remain enchanted for as long as 
possible, but even so it had to mature at some point. “America 
cannot continue to be ruled by amateurs.”40 Maturity, on this 
view, means striking a balance between politics and bureaucracy, 
constantly negotiating and renegotiating the tension between the 
charismatic pursuit of ultimate ends and the rationalistic demand 
for procedure and technique. Tip too far in the direction of 
politics and you get the immature waste of nineteenth-century 
America; tip too far in the direction of bureaucracy and you get 
the superannuated resignation of early-twentieth-century 
Germany. 
And what of America in the early twenty-first century? It is 
worth noting at the outset that contemporary American 
bureaucracy is significantly more complex and internally 
heterogenous than the ideal bureaucratic type described by 
Weber. It of course includes a large number of bureaucrats who 
are close to Weber’s ideal type: career civil servants with 
specialized areas of technical expertise, hired on a nonpartisan 
basis, with tenure protections. For them, bureaucracy can truly be 
said to be vocational. And in (or at least adjacent to) this category, 
we might also include judges’ vocational commitments, the 
partisan nature of their appointment process notwithstanding. 
But the American federal bureaucracy also contains a relatively 
thick layer of officials with no tenure protections who are 
appointed on an explicitly partisan basis. Although we often refer 
to these officials as “political appointees,” it would be a mistake 
to view them as politicians in the Weberian sense, for these 
officials, at least in their capacity as such,41 do not act on their own 
responsibility. Rather, their function is to mediate between the 
ideal-typical politicians above them and the ideal-typical 
bureaucrats below. In performing this mediating function, these 
officials do not fully partake of the vocation of either the politician 
 
 39. Weber, Parliament and Government, supra note 7, at 1398. 
 40. WEBER, supra note 2, at 71.  
 41. This qualification is necessary because many people appointed to such positions 
have previously been active politicians in the Weberian sense, and many of them hope to 
be such in the future. But in their current capacity as appointed leadership at bureaucratic 
agencies, they cannot be said to be Weberian politicians.  
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or the bureaucrat. Rather, they should be understood as partaking 
of the forms of action characteristic of each at different times (and 
sometimes simultaneously), in order to facilitate the simultaneous 
functioning of each. 
As this American bureaucracy grew and developed in the 
decades after Weber passed away, it increasingly came into 
tension with elected politicians—just as one would expect in a 
mature polity. In the canonical expression of that tension, 
outgoing President Harry Truman contrasted his successor’s 
experience atop a military bureaucracy with what he anticipated 
would be his experience in politics: “He’ll sit here … and he’ll say, 
‘Do this! Do that!’ And nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won’t 
be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating.”42 And indeed 
the difficulty of getting things to “happen” has been an almost 
constant complaint of presidents (and other political leaders) of 
both parties in the decades since. (Indeed, this sense has been 
behind repeated attempts to “marketize” the bureaucracy, 
attempts that Jon Michaels has convincingly demonstrated are 
actually aimed at giving politicians increased control over it.43) 
Bureaucracy, precisely because of its characteristic forms and 
procedures, will tend to implement politicians’ programs more 
slowly and with more moderations and qualifications than those 
politicians would like. What’s more, those forms and procedures 
can be deployed deliberately to frustrate politicians when they 
and the bureaucracy are at loggerheads. 
Just as the internal structure of modern American 
bureaucratic agencies is more complex than that portrayed by 
Weber, so too are the forms of bureaucratic action. Weber 
suggested that it was the “duty and even [the] honor” of 
bureaucrats to carry out directives with which they disagree,44 but 
bureaucratic activity does not operate in a carry out / defy binary. 
Indeed, the bureaucratic insistence on procedure, on record-
keeping, on reason-giving, and on respecting prescribed forms 
gives rise to myriad opportunities for what Jennifer Nou has 
characterized as “bureaucratic resistance from below.”45 For 
 
 42. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF 
LEADERSHIP 9 (1960).  
 43. See generally JON MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S 
THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 119–41 (2017).  
 44. See supra text accompanying note 31.  
 45. Jennifer Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance from Below, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE 
& COMMENT (Nov. 16, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-
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instance, given the timeline on which politicians usually want 
action to occur, a commitment by bureaucrats to build an 
especially thorough record before acting can be an intense irritant 
to their political superiors. That record, in turn, can be used by 
other bureaucratic actors (including the courts) in evaluating the 
action, and it can form the basis of public politics by the opponents 
of the politicians who demanded the action in the first place. In 
this case, the bureaucrats’ actions—building a thorough and 
detailed public record—is deeply consistent with the ethical 
obligations of their office.46 They have simply weaponized those 
ethics to push back against politicians who seek to direct action in 
a manner that the bureaucracy opposes.47 
Consider, then, the various forms of bureaucratic pushback 
that have characterized the Trump Administration to date. At the 
most extreme, there have been moments of outright defiance: 
most notably a mere ten days into the administration’s tenure, 
when Acting Attorney General Sally Yates refused to defend in 
court an executive order imposing a ban on nationals of a number 
of Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States. 
Yates was immediately fired for her insubordination.48 Perhaps 
with a view to retaining her/his job, another “senior official in the 
Trump administration” in 2018 anonymously published an op-ed 
in the New York Times declaring that “many of the senior officials 
in [Trump’s] own administration are working diligently from 
within to frustrate parts of his agenda and his worst inclinations. I 
would know. I am one of them.”49 On a Weberian view, both 
Yates and the anonymous official acted inconsistently with their 
ethical obligations, which would have counseled that (after 
expressing their reservations) they carry out the orders of their 
political superiors. Many other officials, sensing a similar 
 
by-jennifer-nou/. See also Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National 
Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139, 163–65 (2018). 
 46. See supra text accompanying notes 10–16. 
 47. In this regard, it can be understood as a form of what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and 
David Pozen have termed “uncivil obedience”—that is, “subversive law-following.” 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811 
(2015). Here, the bureaucrats would be engaged in subversive adherence to the ethics of 
their office. 
 48. Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Fires Justice Chief Who Defied Him, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 31, 2017, at A1.  
 49. Anonymous, I am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-
anonymous-resistance.html.  
2 - CHAFETZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/19 8:29 PM 
28 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:17 
 
disconnect between the ethical demands of their position and 
their personal views, have simply quit.50 (Although voluntary 
departures from the bureaucracy may at first glance seem 
congenial to an administration that has declared war on the 
administrative state,51 it is worth remembering that deregulation, 
like regulation, requires competent bureaucratic work.) 
Many other forms of bureaucratic pushback have stopped 
well short of insubordination or resignation. Indeed, some have 
come through well-established mechanisms, such as the State 
Department’s “dissent cable,”52 via which career foreign service 
officers can register their disagreement with official policy. Others 
have come in the form of bureaucrats conscientiously doing their 
jobs:53 staff at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the Department of Energy, and elsewhere have 
produced reports arguing that anthropogenic climate change is 
real and that significantly increasing use of renewable energy is a 
viable response to it.54 In another case, “Pentagon staffers 
effectively stalled a Trump reversal of an Obama policy on 
climate change and national security by initiating a review [that 
was] apparently still underway nine months later.”55 Canny 
bureaucrats can also rebrand old programs so as to make them 
appear sympathetic to new political priorities, as when State 
Department staff relabeled a foreign aid program as “a way to 
create markets for U.S. exports,”56 or when the General Services 
Administration continued its program to purchase electric 
 
 50. See Lisa Rein & Andrew Ba Tran, How the Trump Era Is Changing the Federal 
Bureaucracy, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-
the-trump-era-is-changing-the-federal-bureaucracy/2017/12/30/8d5149c6-daa7-11e7-b859-
fb0995360725_story.html (noting that “[t]here are signs that Trump’s polarizing presidency 
has helped drive more civil servants to the exits this year” and that “[i]n some agencies, 
the number of people leaving has been crippling”). 
 51. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative 
State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017).  
 52. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Dissent on Travel Ban Spreads from One Embassy to 
Another, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2017, at A1.  
 53. Cf. Ingber, supra note 45, at 165 (“The piece of resistance that is simply ‘work,’ 
but that nevertheless keeps the machinery of the bureaucracy from changing direction on 
a dime or from taking action as quickly as it otherwise might, is the bread and butter of 
bureaucratic life.”).  
 54. See Christopher Flavelle & Benjamin Bain, Washington Bureaucrats Are Quietly 
Working to Undermine Trump’s Agenda, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2017, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-12-18/washington-bureaucrats-are-
chipping-away-at-trump-s-agenda.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
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vehicles but began justifying it in terms of job-creation and cost-
cutting, rather than environmental benefits.57 Because their 
political superiors cannot possibly monitor every action taken by 
bureaucrats, many of these small-scale actions by the bureaucracy 
will persist, even if contrary to politicians’ wishes. What’s more, 
some bureaucratic entities—so-called “independent agencies”58—
have structural features that lessen even their formal 
responsiveness to politicians, resulting in policies that may be at 
odds with those of the administration. The Federal Reserve, for 
instance, has set monetary policy in a manner at odds with 
Trump’s expressed wishes.59 
Much bureaucratic pushback has been carried out, or at least 
facilitated, by leaks to the press. Longtime political reporters 
routinely characterize the Trump White House as the leakiest in 
history.60 Of course, senior White House staff have long leaked to 
position-take, score-settle, or otherwise move policy in their 
preferred direction.61 But White House leaking has also been 
matched by leaking (or other forms of public communication at 
odds with the White House’s official line) from the agencies 
 
 57. Id.  
 58. On the porosity of this term, see generally Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, 
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 
(2013). 
 59. See Christopher Condon & Steve Matthews, Trump Slams Fed Hours After 
Powell Lifts Interest Rates, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2018, 4:34 PM), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2018-09-26/trump-slams-fed-hours-after-his-pick-powell-lifts-interest-
rates; Heather Long, Can the ‘Strong’ U.S. Economy Survive Until 2020?, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/08/27/can-strong-us-
economy-survive-until/; Matt O’Brien, Trump Thinks the Fed Has Gone ‘Loco.’ Wait Until 
He Sees What It Does Next., WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/2018/10/19/trump-thinks-fed-has-gone-loco-wait-until-he-sees-what-it-does-
next/. 
 60. See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, There’s 1 Very Simple Reason Why This Is the Leakiest 
White House Ever, CNN (May 15, 2018, 9:45 AM), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/05/15/politics/trump-leaks/index.html; Jonah Goldberg, Why the Trump White House 
Is So Leaky, NAT’L REV. (May 12, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.national
review.com/2017/05/trump-white-house-leaks-show-president-dramatic-personality/; 
Dara Lind, The Real Reason the Trump Administration Has Such a Leak Problem, VOX 
(July 27, 2017, 9:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/19/15662842/
trump-leaks-stop; Jonathan Swan, White House Leakers Leak About Leaking, AXIOS 
(May 13, 2018), https://www.axios.com/trump-white-house-leakers-leak-about-leaking-
dae05b8e-e792-41a7-bb74-c2756b542cd0.html; Paul Waldman, The Leakiest White House 
in History, THE WEEK (May 16, 2018), http://theweek.com/articles/773355/leakiest-white-
house-history. 
 61. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and 
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 532–33 (2013).  
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themselves—from Twitter accounts going “rogue”62 to cabinet 
secretaries claiming that the president does not speak for the 
United States.63 Moreover, leaks can reinforce other forms of 
bureaucratic pushback64: when Department of Energy staffers 
drafted a report finding that growth in renewable energy did not 
threaten power-grid reliability, they leaked the report to the 
media to prevent their superiors from making substantive changes 
to the final draft.65 
One should also understand the special counsel’s 
investigation that began early in Trump’s presidency as a form of 
bureaucratic pushback. In recusing himself from overseeing the 
investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 election, 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions was adhering to a bureaucratic 
ethics of impartiality, and he was signaling that there would be 
some distance between the White House and the investigation.66 
A little over two months later—and a little over a week after 
Trump fired FBI Director James Comey, who had testified before 
Congress that his agency was investigating ties between Russia 
and the Trump campaign—Deputy Attorney General Rod 
Rosenstein appointed another former FBI Director, Robert 
Mueller, as special counsel.67 Mueller’s ongoing investigation, 
carried out in an apparently methodical and professional manner, 
has resulted in short order in a striking number of indictments, 
 
 62. See Madison Malone Kircher, The National Park Service’s Twitter Goes Rogue, 
Gets Banned from Tweeting, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 21, 2017), 
http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/01/national-park-service-tweets-about-trump-inaugura
tion-crowd.html.  
 63. Anne Gearan, Tillerson Says Trump ‘Speaks for Himself’ on Values, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/08/27
/tillerson-says-trump-speaks-for-himself-on-values/. 
 64. See generally Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology 
of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011 (2008). 
 65. Flavelle & Bain, supra note 54.  
 66. See Mark Landler & Eric Lichtblau, Jeff Sessions Recuses Himself from Russia 
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/us/politics/jeff-
sessions-russia-trump-investigation-democrats.html.  
 67. On Comey’s testimony, see Matt Apuzzo, Matthew Rosenberg & Emmarie 
Huetteman, F.B.I. Is Investigating Trump’s Russia Ties, Comey Confirms, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/us/politics/fbi-investigation-trump-
russia-comey.html. On Mueller’s appointment, see Devlin Barrett, Sari Horowitz & Matt 
Zapotosky, Deputy Attorney General Appoints Special Counsel to Oversee Probe of 
Russian Interference in Election, WASH. POST (May 18, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/deputy-attorney-general-appoints-special-counsel-to-
oversee-probe-of-russian-interference-in-election/2017/05/17/302c1774-3b49-11e7-8854-
21f359183e8c_story.html. 
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guilty pleas, and (to date) one conviction.68 These have included 
the conviction of Trump’s campaign manager Paul Manafort on 
eight charges of fraud and his guilty plea on two other charges,69 
the guilty pleas of his National Security Advisor (Michael Flynn) 
and his deputy campaign manager and deputy inaugural 
committee chair (Rick Gates),70 and, in a case that was handed off 
from the special counsel’s office to the U.S. Attorney’s office for 
the Southern District of New York, the guilty plea of Trump’s 
personal lawyer in a manner that implicated Trump himself in 
campaign finance violations.71 This is a strikingly aggressive form 
of bureaucratic resistance to a political leader. 
Finally, recall that, on a Weberian model of the bureaucracy, 
judges are a type of bureaucrat.72 And judges too have been 
systematically pushing back against Trump on issues ranging from 
immigration73 to environmental regulation74 to his attempt to ban 
transgendered persons from military service75 to his attempts to 
undermine the Affordable Care Act.76 Indeed, in one case a 
 
 68. For a running tally, see Marshall Cohen, Tal Yellin & Liz Stark, Tracking the 
Russia Investigations, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/politics/russia-
investigations/#/investigations/specialCounsel/charges (last updated Dec. 12, 2018).  
 69. Spencer S. Hsu, Devlin Barrett & Justin Jouvenal, Manafort Will Cooperate with 
Mueller as Part of Guilty Plea, Prosecutor Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/manafort-plans-to-plead-guilty-
to-second-set-of-charges/2018/09/14/a1541068-b5c9-11e8-a7b5-adaaa5b2a57f_story.html; 
Sharon LaFraniere, Paul Manafort, Trump’s Former Campaign Manager, Guilty of 8 
Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/us/politics/paul-
manafort-trial-verdict.html. 
 70. See Cohen, Yellin & Stark, supra note 68.  
 71. William K. Rashbaum et al., Michael Cohen Says He Arranged Payments to 
Women at Trump’s Direction, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/08/21/nyregion/michael-cohen-plea-deal-trump.html.  
 72. See supra text accompanying note 13.  
 73. See Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1453 & nn.87–90 (2018). 
 74. See Ruairí Arrieta-Kenna, Trump’s Environmental Agenda Is Crashing Into the 
Courts, VOX (Aug. 11, 2017, 1:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2017/8/11/16113348/trump-environmental-agenda-crashing-into-courts; 
Michael Grunwald, The Myth of Scott Pruitt’s EPA Rollback, POLITICO (Apr. 7, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/04/07/scott-pruitt-epa-accomplishments-
rollback-217834; Oliver Milman, Blow for EPA as Court Blocks Bid to Slacken Safety 
Rules for Chemical Plants, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2018, 12:35 PM), https://www.the
guardian.com/environment/2018/aug/17/epa-setback-court-chemical-safety-environment 
(noting that an EPA loss before the D.C. Circuit “is the third such setback for the agency 
in a week”). 
 75. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017) (granting a 
preliminary injunction); Stockman v. Trump, 2017 WL 9732572 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (same); 
Karnoski v. Trump, 2017 WL 6311305 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (same).  
 76. See Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2018) (vacating an 
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federal judge angrily ordered a plane turned around mid-flight 
when he learned that the government was in the process of 
deporting the plaintiffs in a lawsuit challenging the 
administration’s restrictions on asylum claims.77 A federal judge 
has denied Trump’s motion to dismiss a suit filed by the District 
of Columbia and the state of Maryland alleging that his ownership 
of the Trump International Hotel in Washington constitutes a 
violation of the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses,78 and 
another federal judge has held that Democratic members of 
Congress have standing to sue Trump for violating the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause.79 These rulings in toto have led some 
observers to claim that there is a more-or-less organized “legal 
resistance” against Trump.80 
It is worth noting that these examples of bureaucratic 
resistance have cut across some of what we might normally think 
of as the most salient distinctions in American institutional 
politics. They have involved pushback by politically appointed 
officials who serve at will, as well as by career civil servants. They 
have involved pushback in agencies typically characterized as 
executive, independent, and judicial. They have involved 
pushback on grounds ranging from policy disagreements to norm 
violations to illegality. Of course, those distinctions are relevant 
to the frequency of the resistance, the form it takes, and the 
likelihood of its success—but, crucially, the logic of Weberian 
bureaucratic situatedness seems sufficiently powerful to, at least 
sometimes, cut across these distinctions.81 
 
administration waiver that allowed states to impose work requirements as a condition for 
Medicaid eligibility).  
 77. Although the judge said, “Turn that plane around and bring those people back 
to the United States,” it turned out to be impossible to turn the plane around midflight, so 
the plaintiffs were returned to the United States after they landed in El Salvador. See Mike 
James, Judge Orders Plane Carrying Deported Mother and Daughter to Turn Around, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 10, 2018, 1:04 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/08/09/pretty-
outrageous-federal-judge-blasts-u-s-orders-plane-carrying-deported-mother-and-
daughter-turn/952310002/.  
 78. Dist. of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (D. Md. 2018). 
 79. Blumenthal v. Trump, 1:17-cv-01154 (D.D.C. 2017).  
 80. See Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 73, at 1453 & n.90.  
 81. See Ingber, supra note 45, at 157 (“[I]n reality there are few true crisp 
dichotomies, whether between the President and the bureaucracy; the politically 
appointed and civil service; the partisan and the impartial; or the high-level officials and 
the low…. [B]ureaucratic actors at each point along each of these many spectra intersect 
and tussle with others above, below, and horizontal to them across the bureaucracy.”).  
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None of this, of course, is to suggest that the Trump 
Administration has not changed national policy, in many cases 
significantly. Nor is it to suggest that bureaucratic resistance can 
last indefinitely.82 At some point, options for delay or 
undermining will run out; at some point, new personnel, more 
congenial to the political leadership, will be in place. But the 
extent of bureaucratic pushback against the Trump presidency 
has been remarkable—so much so that Trump’s supporters have 
imported the foreign, and ominous, concept of a “deep state” to 
describe it.83 But from a Weberian perspective, we might 
understand it as something else, as a clash between the 
rationalistic ethos of the bureaucratic corps and the charismatic 
politics of Donald Trump. Trump’s attempts to sweep aside 
bureaucratic procedures, practices, and priorities that conflict 
with his policy positions have met with some success, but they 
have also met with no small measure of the frustration that 
Truman prophesied for Eisenhower. That is, there appears to be 
something of the balance between the bureaucratic and the 
political that Weber understood as characterizing a mature state. 
Naturally this is intolerable to the president and his 
supporters, who have argued that the “deep state” is engaged in a 
nefarious subversion of the legitimate state.84 The administration 
has repeatedly attacked bureaucratic pushback in manners 
ranging from questioning the legitimacy of judicial actors85 to 
attacking the safeguards of bureaucratic tenure86 to firing high-
 
 82. See Ingber, supra note 45, at 189–201 (noting the functional constraints on 
bureaucratic pushback).  
 83. See Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 
1653 (2018) (“Whether cast as insidious or cast aside as fictitious, the American ‘deep state’ 
is an increasingly compelling concept in the Age of Trump. In a year’s time, a label that 
had practically no domestic resonance has been elevated to the status of public enemy 
number one.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 23, 2018, 6:54 
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/999242039723163648 (“Look how 
things have turned around on the Criminal Deep State. They go after Phony Collusion 
with Russia, a made up Scam, and end up getting caught in a major SPY scandal the likes 
of which this country may never have seen before! What goes around, comes around! [sic 
all]”). 
 85. See Amy B. Wang, Trump Lashes Out at ‘So-Called Judge’ Who Temporarily 
Blocked Travel Ban, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/04/trump-lashes-out-at-federal-judge-who-temporarily-blocked-
travel-ban/.  
 86. See Lisa Rein, Trump Takes Aim at Federal Bureaucracy with New Executive 
Orders Rolling Back Civil-Service Protections, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-takes-aim-at-federal-bureaucracy-with-
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ranking bureaucrats who have proven uncooperative87 to 
stripping the security clearance from a former CIA director 
turned Trump critic.88 And of course Trump has repeatedly 
referred to the special counsel’s investigation as a “witch hunt”89 
and repeatedly mused about firing Mueller or the Justice 
Department leadership to which he answers.90 In seeking to 
undermine the bureaucracy in these ways, Trump is seeking, in 
Weberian terms, to de-mature the American state, to return it to 
the condition in which it “could not survive without major abuses: 
corruption and the squandering of resources on a vast scale such 
as could only be borne by a nation with as yet unlimited economic 
prospects.”91 It seems fitting, then, that Trump’s favorite 
predecessor in office is the man whose name is most closely 
associated with the spoils system: Andrew Jackson.92 
The Weberian perspective also suggests a perhaps 
counterintuitive way of evaluating the Trump presidency. 
Although it is his flamboyant defiance of governing norms and his 
wild lurches in policy that tend to make the most news, they are 
perhaps less concerning in the short term in part because of the 
 
new-executive-orders-altering-civil-service-protections/2018/05/25/3ed8bf84-6055-11e8-
9ee3-49d6d4814c4c_story.html. In yet another example of pushback from the courts, a 
federal court has permanently enjoined enforcement of much of these attempted changes. 
Am. Fed. of Gov. Employees v. Trump, 318 F. Supp. 3d 370 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 87. See, e.g., Steve Benen, Why the FBI Firing Peter Strzok, A Frequent Trump Critic, 
Matters, MSNBC (Aug. 13, 2018, 3:18 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-
show/why-the-fbi-firing-peter-strzok-frequent-trump-target-matters.  
 88. David Nakamura & Felicia Sonmez, Trump Revokes Security Clearance of 
Former CIA Director John Brennan—a Leading Critic of the President, WASH. POST (Aug. 
15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-revokes-security-clearance-of-
former-cia-director-john-brennan/2018/08/15/043b6fc4-a0bb-11e8-8e87-
c869fe70a721_story.html.  
 89. See, e.g., Sahil Chinoy, Jessia Ma & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump’s Growing 
Obsession with the ‘Witch Hunt’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/08/22/opinion/trump-cohen-mueller-investigation.html. 
 90. See Margaret Hartmann, Will Trump Actually Fire Mueller, Rosenstein, or 
Sessions?, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 11, 2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/04/will-
trump-actually-fire-mueller-rosenstein-or-sessions.html. In November 2018, Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions was forced out of his job, although that has had no discernible effect 
on the special counsel’s investigation as this Essay goes to press. See Peter Baker, Katie 
Benner & Michael D. Shear, Jeff Sessions Is Forced Out as Attorney General as Trump 
Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/
us/politics/sessions-resigns.html. 
 91. WEBER, supra note 2, at 69.  
 92. See Jenna Johnson & Karen Tumulty, Trump Cites Andrew Jackson as His 
Hero—And a Reflection of Himself, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/trump-cites-andrew-jackson-as-his-hero—and-a-reflection-of-himself/
2017/03/15/4da8dc8c-0995-11e7-a15f-a58d4a988474_story.html.  
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bureaucratic capacity and willingness to push back.93 But Trump’s 
willingness to take steps to weaken or undermine bureaucratic 
resistance—and, to be clear, similar steps that political actors have 
been taking for decades now94—tends to receive far less attention. 
And yet, in the medium term, it is precisely the attempts to de-
mature the state by attacking bureaucratic independence or 
competence that could have the most serious consequences by 
removing the rationalistic bureaucratic impediment to unchecked 
charismatic political rule. The threat, in other words, is the mirror-
image of the one perceived by Weber in Germany a century ago: 
he feared that the growing power of the bureaucracy had created 
an imbalance by causing political abilities to atrophy. Today, we 
might more plausibly fear an imbalance caused by the atrophying 
of bureaucratic capacity. 
II. A MATURE PRESIDENT? 
“[T]here is no more destructive distortion of political energy 
than when the parvenu swaggers around, boasting of his power, 
conceitedly reveling in its reflected glory ….” 
- Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1919)95 
There is, in some sense, a fractal quality to Weber’s analysis 
of the mature polity: the balance that characterizes the mature 
state relies, not only on the balance of power between the 
bureaucracy and the politicians, but also on the balanced 
character of the politicians themselves. The bureaucrat is defined 
by her place within an established hierarchy and is expected to 
take on the goals and methods of the machine of which she is a 
part. But the politician can claim no such rationalistic 
situatedness; she instead must rely on her individual character. 
Weber thus has a good deal to say about the characterological 
aspects of a mature politician. 
Specifically, Weber argues that “three qualities, above all, 
are of decisive importance for a politician: passion, a sense of 
responsibility, and a sense of proportion.”96 Passion requires a 
 
 93. This can be understood as analogous to the argument that David Pozen and I 
have made that attempts at norm “decomposition” should be understood as more 
worrisome than spectacular attempts at norm “destruction.” Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 
73, at 1445–58. 
 94. See generally MICHAELS, supra note 43, at 79–141.  
 95. WEBER, supra note 2, at 78.  
 96. Id. at 76.  
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cause—as noted above, it can only be politics, not bureaucracy, 
that gives the state its ends.97 But passion alone is insufficient; the 
politician must not only pursue a cause, she must pursue it with a 
sense of responsibility for its achievement.98 For Weber, to be a 
politician is to take responsibility for the achievement of the goals 
you have put forward. And taking responsibility for the 
achievement of one’s chosen ends requires “a sense of proportion 
… [that is,] the ability to allow realities to impinge on you while 
maintaining an inner calm and composure.”99 In other words, the 
politician must both have a passion and have sufficient distance 
from that passion so as to be able to pursue it efficaciously. 
The likeliest failing in a politician, then, is “vanity, the deadly 
enemy of all dedication to a cause and of all distance, in this case, 
the distance from oneself.”100 There are two distinct ways in which 
vanity can be the downfall of a politician. In one, it takes the form 
of the desire for power becoming an end in itself, rather than a 
means of bringing about some desired end for the state. In this 
form, vanity means that the politician’s passion has taken as its 
focal point himself, rather than some external good. Weber 
describes the politician who has fallen prey to this form of vanity 
as a “parvenu, swagger[ing] around, boasting of his power, 
conceitedly reveling in its reflected glory.”101 
The other way in which vanity might destroy a politician is by 
undermining his sense of responsibility. One version of this 
phenomenon consists in privileging what Weber calls the “ethics 
of conviction” over the “ethics of responsibility.”102 In other 
words, it is an abdication of political responsibility to act as a 
moral purist, when politics demands compromise, even on matters 
of principle.103 Someone who stands on principle even in the face 
of bad political consequences “is in fact a mere child in political 
matters.”104 But there’s another, even more straightforward way 
 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 34–37.  
 98. WEBER, supra note 2, at 77. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 78. See also id. at 77 (“[T]he sin against the Holy Spirit of [politicians’] 
profession begins where this striving for power is separated from the matter in hand and 
becomes an object purely of self-intoxication instead of something that enters exclusively 
into the service of their ‘cause.’”). 
 102. Id. at 83.  
 103. See id. at 85 (“The man who embraces an ethics of conviction is unable to tolerate 
the ethical irrationality of the world. He is a cosmic, ethical ‘rationalist.’”). 
 104. Id. at 86.  
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in which a politician may fail to be responsible, and that is simply 
by refusing to take responsibility for the consequences of her 
actions. The politician ought to be “uncomplaining,” which 
Weber also describes using the gendered language of “manly” and 
“chivalr[ous].”105 The politician ought to be forward-looking, but 
the complainer is always looking backwards, trying to 
readjudicate past failures or revel in past victories.106 
Resisting the urge to complain is never easy, and may be 
especially difficult in politics, because politics under conditions of 
modernity (which is to say, disenchantment) is always at least 
potentially tragic. It requires, in the words of David Owen and 
Tracy Strong, 
the recognition that any action taken is taken under 
circumstances where the consequences of that action are not 
only not apparent but over the long term do not add up to make 
sense (as Hegel had thought they would). The acceptance of 
this, and the avoidance of the plea of good intentions, no 
matter what the outcome, is what distinguishes an adult from a 
child. Mistakes are to be attributed to insufficient skill and 
commitment.107 
Politics requires good intentions—that is the requirement that the 
politician be passionate in support of a cause—but good 
intentions are insufficient. They must be pursued skillfully, with a 
sense of proportion and a willingness to compromise, and even 
then there is no guarantee of success. But in the face of failure, 
the mature politician does not plead good intentions: there’s no 
whining in politics.108 
So, what might Weber’s analysis of the character of the 
mature politician suggest about our current moment? It hardly 
seems a stretch to suggest that “maturity” is not one of the words 
most commonly used to characterize Donald Trump.109 Indeed, 
 
 105. Id. at 79–80.  
 106. See id. at 80 (“Instead of focusing on those issues that concern the politician, 
namely, the future and our responsibility for the future, such an ethic becomes immersed 
in questions of past guilt, which are politically sterile . . . .”).  
 107. Owen & Strong, supra note 18, at xliv.  
 108. Cf. A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN (Parkway Productions 1992) (“There’s no crying 
in baseball!”).  
 109. In fact, thanks to polling, we know what words are most commonly used to 
characterize Trump. An ABC News/Washington Post poll found that the ten words 
respondents most associated with him were: “incompetent,” “arrogant,” “strong,” “idiot,” 
“egotistical,” “ignorant,” “great,” “racist,” “asshole” and “narcissistic.” John Verhovek, 
10 Most Common Words Americans Use to Describe Trump, ABC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2017), 
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political scientist Daniel Drezner has maintained a “toddler-in-
chief” Twitter thread, a running count of all of the times that 
Trump’s aides and allies have described him in terms applicable 
to a small child.110 By the end of 2018, the thread had topped 600 
entries.111 
More granularly, we might think in terms of Weber’s two 
types of political vanity. First, there is the vanity of pursuing 
power as an end in itself, rather than as a means to some other-
regarding passion. So, what of Trump’s commitment to ends 
beyond himself? There is a sense in which Trump appears to be 
almost wholly innocent of policy goals—indeed, to be unsure why 
he ran for president in the first place.112 He seems far more 
interested in playing golf113 and watching coverage of himself on 
television114 than in doing any of the work of governing. If that 
reading of Trump is correct—if, that is, his interest is in power and 
its trappings for their own sake—then he is best characterized as 
 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/incompetent-strong-egotistical-words-people-describe-
trump/story?id=50178088. A Quinnipiac University Poll found similar results. December 
12, 2017—American Voters Have Few Kind Words for Trump, Quinnipiac University 
National Poll Finds; Expel Moore If He Wins, Voters Say Almost 2-1, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. 
POLL (Dec. 12, 2017), https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2507.  
 110. The thread itself can be found at Daniel W. Drezner (@dandrezner), TWITTER 
(Apr. 25, 2017, 10:23 AM), https://twitter.com/dandrezner/status/856876322001432581. 
Drezner described his criteria for inclusion and collected the first 320 examples at Daniel 
W. Drezner, White House Aides Can’t Stop Talking About President Trump Like He’s a 
Toddler, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
posteverything/wp/2017/08/21/the-trump-as-toddler-thread-explained-and-curated/. 
 111. See Daniel W. Drezner (@dandrezner), TWITTER (Dec. 30, 2018, 9:57 PM), 
https://twitter.com/dandrezner/status/1079572243674550272 (presenting the 604th entry in 
the thread). 
 112. See Jack Shafer, Trump Doesn’t Want to Be President, POLITICO (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/22/trump-doesnt-want-to-be-president-
215292; David Von Drehle, Trump Doesn’t Seem to Like Being President. So Why Not 
Quit?, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-
doesnt-seem-to-like-being-president-so-why-not-quit/2017/08/18/83c2e38e-842a-11e7-
902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html.  
 113. See John Parkinson, 500 Days of Trump: His Presidency, By the Numbers, ABC 
NEWS (June 4, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/500-days-trump-presidency-
numbers/story?id=55635385 (revealing that “Trump’s trips to a golf course have topped 
102 excursions through his first 500 days in office . . . .”). 
 114. See Elaine Godfrey, Trump’s TV Obsession Is a First, ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/donald-trump-americas-first-tv-
president/521640/.  
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the politician who lacks a cause,115 that is, as Weber’s vain 
parvenu.116 
But there is another reading of Trump—a darker one—in 
which it is possible to identify a cause of sorts that he pursues: a 
nostalgic identity politics expressed as longing for a period in 
which explicit public manifestations of white supremacism, 
patriarchy, and Christian identity were more culturally 
acceptable. This core commitment could explain not only his 
electoral support,117 but also everything from the unspecified 
nostalgia of his campaign slogan (“Make America Great Again”) 
to his praise for white supremacists118 to his attempts to keep 
nonwhite foreigners from entering the United States119 to his 
repeated sexist comments, including bragging about committing 
sexual assault.120 To the extent that Donald Trump can be said to 
be animated by a passion for a cause greater than himself, it is this: 
that America should return to a time when the wages of 
whiteness, maleness, and Christianity were higher than they are 
today.121 
 
 115. See WEBER, supra note 2, at 77 (“[T]he sin against the Holy Spirit of [politicians’] 
profession begins where this striving for power is separated from the matter in hand and 
becomes an object purely of self-intoxication instead of something that enters exclusively 
into the service of their ‘cause.’”). 
 116. See id. at 78.  
 117. See Diana C. Mutz, Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 
Presidential Vote, 115 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. E4330 (2018), available at 
https://doi.org/10.1073/PNAS.1718155115; Brian F. Schaffner, Matthew MacWilliams & 
Tatishe Nteta, Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The 
Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism, 133 POL. SCI. Q. 9 (2018); John Sides, Michael Tesler 
& Lynn Vavreck, The 2016 U.S. Election: How Trump Lost and Won, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 
34, 39–43 (2017); Thomas B. Edsall, Donald Trump’s Identity Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/opinion/donald-trump-identity-
politics.html. 
 118. See Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Trump Gives White Supremacists an 
Unequivocal Boost, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/
us/politics/trump-charlottesville-white-nationalists.html.  
 119. See Rick Gladstone & Satoshi Sugiyama, Trump’s Travel Ban: How It Works and 
Who Is Affected, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/
americas/travel-ban-trump-how-it-works.html; Brian Naylor, Trump Unveils Legislation 
Limiting Legal Immigration, NPR (Aug. 2, 2017, 10:03 AM), https://www.npr.org
/2017/08/02/541104795/trump-to-unveil-legislation-limiting-legal-immigration; The Wall, 
USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/border-wall/.  
 120. See Claire Cohen, Donald Trump and Sexism: How I Tracked Every Lewd 
Comment, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 2, 2018, 8:43 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/
politics/donald-trump-sexism-my-year-tracking-every-lewd-comment/; Jill Filipovic, Our 
President Has Always Degraded Women—And We’ve Always Let Him, TIME (Dec. 5, 
2017), http://time.com/5047771/donald-trump-comments-billy-bush/.  
 121. On the idea of privilege by birth functioning as “a sort of public and psychological 
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But even if we can understand Trump as pursuing some 
other-regarding cause, it hardly seems that he has done so with a 
sense of Weberian political responsibility. Few observers would 
use words like “uncomplaining” or “chivalrous” to characterize 
him. Indeed, Trump seems fixated on relitigating the past, 
constantly bringing up (and misrepresenting) everything from the 
size of his electoral college victory122 to Hillary Clinton’s email 
server.123 When this tendency was noted during his presidential 
campaign, Trump responded as follows: “I do whine because I 
want to win and I’m not happy about not winning and I am a 
whiner and I keep whining and whining until I win.”124 This trend 
has continued into his presidency:125 upon meeting resistance, 
Trump’s first instinct appears to be to deflect responsibility, 
blaming everything from the “deep state”126 to the “fake news” 
media127 to a “witch hunt”128 to the legislative process.129 
Thus, whether we understand Trump as having almost no 
goals beyond the retention of power and prestige or as pursuing a 
set of goals but constantly pleading that his good intentions have 
been stymied by nefarious forces beyond his control, it is apparent 
that he can be understood as exhibiting at least one of the two 
 
wage,” see W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860–1880, at 700–
01 (Free Press 1998) (1935). 
 122. See Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman, The Election Is Over, But Trump Can’t 
Seem to Get Past It, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/us/
politics/election-is-over-but-trump-still-cant-seem-to-get-past-it.html. 
 123. See John Wagner, ‘Come on Jeff’: Trump Continues Public Feud with Sessions, 
Urging Investigations of the ‘Other Side’, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/come-on-jeff-trump-continues-public-feud-with-session-
urging-investigations-of-the-other-side/2018/08/24/ac5d329e-a784-11e8-97ce-
cc9042272f07_story.html.  
 124. Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: ‘I Keep Whining and Whining Until I Win’, 
CNN (Aug. 11, 2015, 3:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/11/politics/donald-trump-
refutes-third-party-run-report/index.html.  
 125. See Charles M. Blow, America’s Whiniest ‘Victim’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/opinion/donald-trump-unfair.html.  
 126. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  
 127. See Assoc. Press, Trump Defends Tweets as ‘Modern Day Presidential’ in 
Renewed Attack on Media, L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2017, 6:49 PM), http://www.latimes.com
/politics/la-pol-updates-everything-president-fake-1498958671-htmlstory.html; Steve Coll, 
Donald Trump’s “Fake News” Tactics, NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/11/donald-trumps-fake-news-tactics. 
 128. See Olivia Paschal, Trump’s Tweets and the Creation of ‘Illusory Truth’, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/how-
trumps-witch-hunt-tweets-create-an-illusory-truth/566693/.  
 129. See Molly E. Reynolds, Trump’s Problem Isn’t the Filibuster. It’s the Republicans., 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/opinion/trump-senate-
filibuster-republicans.html.  
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sorts of political vanity against which Weber cautions. Or, put 
differently, he fails to demonstrate the maturity that successful 
politics demands. 
CONCLUSION 
So, in Weberian terms, we have an immature politician sitting 
atop the apparatus of a mature—but perhaps precariously so—
state. What are the implications of this combination? First, if one 
shares what seems to be the bureaucracy’s general disdain for 
Trump’s governing passions, such as they are, then one should 
probably be grateful that he pursues them immaturely. His doing 
so has facilitated much of the bureaucratic pushback. A less vain 
president, one who identified passions greater than himself and 
pursued them responsibly, would give bureaucrats in the agencies, 
the special counsel’s office, the courts, and elsewhere less to work 
with in opposing him. Second, although Trump’s vanity and its 
consequences tend to grab the headlines, the very fact that they 
facilitate bureaucratic pushback limits their dangerousness, at 
least in the short term. Third, and relatedly, we should focus more 
of our attention on attempts to weaken the bureaucracy, to de-
mature it. These are not simply bad for governance—although 
they are that—they are also attempts to unbalance the state in 
favor of the charismatic politician. A time at which the dominant 
charismatic politician also happens to be vain is perhaps an ideal 
time to remember that a mature state requires a balance between 
the bureaucratic and the political. 
 
